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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Ii

I.

Whether a student has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
his education records in view of the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, the Marshall Constitution,
and the United States Constitution and if so, whether the
unauthorized disclosure of those records constitutes a
violation of his state and federal constitutional right to
privacy?

II.

Whether the user of a cordless telphone which is located in
his residence has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
communications under the Marshall Constitution, the
United States Constitution and Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968?

III.

Whether a finding of probable cause is constitutionally
permissible under the Marshall Constitution or the United
States Constitution if made solely on the basis of an
anonymous letter, an unrelated anonymous telephone call,
and the intercepted portion of a telephone conversation?i
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NO. 1984

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL

ROGER CARTER,
Petitioner,
- VS.

-

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MARSHALL,
Respondents.

On Leave To Appeal
From The Appellate Court Of The
State Of Marshall
BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the Appellate Court of the State of Marshall
(R. 4-10) and the Circuit Court of Lincoln County, State of Marshall
(R. 1) are unreported decisions.
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves U.S. Const. amend. I; U.S. Const. amend. IV;
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Mar. Const. art. 1, § 6; 20 U.S.C. § 1232g
(Supp. IV, 1980); 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1983); 34 C.F.R. § 99.01 et
seq. (1983). The texts of these provisions are set forth in pertinent
lix part in the appendix.I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Roger Carter, was not an initial suspect in the narcotics trafficking investigation being conducted by MBI agent Bruce
Collins. The primary targets were two of Petitioner's fellow students at the State University of Marshall, Alfred Rose and Barney
Cooper. (R. 2). On May 13, 1983, in a pre-arranged meeting be-
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tween Agent Collins and Gary Drummer, Dean of Students, Agent
Collins managed to eliminate any need to seek out other independent sources of information concerning backgrounds and activities of
Ross and Cooper, since Dean Drummer readily complied with Collins' informal request to review the students' education records. (R.
2). Only one file was maintained for each student, and every shred
of information gathered about the student was contained therein.
(R. 3). Although it is unclear whether either Ross or Cooper had
ever given their written consent necessary for Agent Collins to gain
access to records without proper legal process, Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (Supp. IV.
1980), (FERPA), Petitioner had not. FERPA was first implicated
when Collins was allowed to gain access to Petitioner's name, which
was included in both files, since no "personally identifiable information" concerning Petitioner could be released without his prior
written consent or proper legal process. Id. Petitioner's name was
included in the student records of Ross and Cooper at least in the
context of their associational ties, as the three studentes belonged
to the same campus organizations and social fraternity. (R. 2).1
Ix
Petitioner had never objected to the disclosure of personally
identifiable information designated as directory information by the
University in a public notice. (R. 3). However, any personally identifiable information beyond his "name, address and telephone
number," (R. 3) could not be disclosed to any unauthorized third
parties, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.5(a)(3), 99.31(a)(9), 99.37(c) (1)-(2) (1983),
since he never signed a written consent form. (R. 3-4).
The mandates of FERPA again came into question when Agent
Collins was granted complete access to Petitioner's education
records without the benefit of prior written consent or proper legal
process. (R. 2, 3, 4); 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2). In Petitioner's file,
Agent Collins found an undated letter from an anonymous "concerned citizen" accusing Petitioner of being "a drug peddler and a
menace to the young people of the coummunity." (R. 2). No other
details were contained in the anonymous letter. (R. 2).
Ten days later, on May 23, Agent Collins was reminded of Petitioner's existence when the MBI received an anonymous telephone
call. (R. 2). An unidentified "neighbor," who claimed to had seen a
cordless telephone in Petitioner's home, suspected him of being a
"drug dealer." (R. 2). In explanation, she reported that the previous night around dinner time, she had intercepted a conversation
over her FM radio. Claiming that she recognized Petitioner's voice,
she stated that he said he had just recieved a "case of coke." (R. 2).
She offered no explanation of why she thought Petitioner was engaged in the sale of drugs. (R. 2).1
lxi
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For the next six days, Agent Collins and Agent Randall Brown
of the MBI staked-out Peitioner's home in an unmarked car parked
500 feet from the house. (R. 2). Despite the fact they had no warrant authorizing an interception of Petitioner's private communications, they continuously monitored Petitioner's cordless telphone
conversations originating from his home from the FM radio of their
car. (R. 2-3). Their unflagging surveillance included looking for
any known addicts or drug dealers, but none were ever seen in the
entire area. (R. 3). Finally, at 10 p.m. of the sixth day, they intercepted a conversation over their radio in which someone identifying
himself as Roger Carter said he had some "good stuff" for sale. (R.
3). The MBI agents tape recorded the entire conversation. (R. 3).
On May 30, the next morning, Agent Collins submitted a sworn
statement alleging this series of events and was issued a search warrant by Lincoln County magistrate authorizing a search of Petitioner's home and seizure of any illegal narcotics and cordless
telephones therein. (R. 3). By 11 a.m., the MBI agents had executed the warrant and had seized "two pounds" of cocaine and a
cordless telephone from the Petitioner's home (R. 3). Petitioner
was arrested and charged with the illegal possession of controlled
substances pursuant to chapter 561/2, section 1402 of the Marshall
lxii Revised Statutes.' (R. 1).i
At his pre-trial hearing, Petitioner filed a motion to quash warrant and suppress the evidence, based on violations of his state and
federal constitutional rights as well as violations of federal statutory law. (R. 3). The only affidavit filed in support of the State's
response to the motion was Dean Drummer's sworn statement
which explained the University's records system, its specification of
categories of directory information by public notice, and Carter's
failure to object to the disclosure of his "name, telephone number
or address" from his own file. (R. 3).
The trial court found that the anonymous letter and anonymous phone call lacked the reliability necessary to satisfy the standards of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). (R. 4). The court also found that seizure
of the anonymous letter by the MBI agents from Petitioner's student records was violative of Petitioner's state and federal constitutional right to privacy, as well as FERPA. Furthermore, the court
found that the MBI's warrantless interception and recording of Petitioner's cordless telephone conversation was in violation of Title
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 18
U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1976). Concluding that neither the anonymous
letter illegally seized from Petitioner's education records nor the
1. Mar. Rev. Stat. (1983).
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illegally intercepted conversation could support the magistrate's
finding of probable cause, the Petitioner's motion to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence was granted. (R. 4).
The trial court granted the state's request for an interlocutory
appeal. (R. 4). The appellate court, in reliance on I United States v. lxiii
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) and 1linois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983), reversed the trial court's order suppressing the evidence and
remanded. (R. 5, 7, 8).
On May 1, 1984, this Court granted Petitioner leave to appeal
the decision of the appellate court in order to review all the issues
raised by the record. (R. 9).1
lxiv
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUEMENT
Petitioner enjoys a legitimate expectation of privacy in his student records by virtue of the Congressional policy underlying the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974. Notwithstanding this express statutory recognition, article I, section 6 of the Marshall Constitution contains strong proscriptive language which is
rendered meaningless unless Petitioner is afforded a legitimate expectation of privacy in his student records. Furthermore, Petitioner
has a privacy interest in his student records, which is protected
under the first, fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution.
Petitioner enjoys a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
cordless telphone conversations under article I, section 6, which
prohibits interceptions of communications, especially where technological developments threaten the privacy of those communications. The first, fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution provide a recognizable zone of privacy which
protects Petitioner from interceptions of communications when
they originate in a private residence. And finally, the interception
of Petitioner's private communications was in violation of Title III
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 since
the privacy interest of a cordless telephone user is protected under
Title III and outweighs the law enforcement concerns embodied
therein.
The State of Marshall must retain the Aguilar-Spinelli test
under Article I, section 6, lest the supplementary protection it affords citizens of Marshall from unreasonable invasions of privacy
and interceptions of communciations losel its significance. Even if 11
the anonymous letter and the intercepted portion of Petitioner's
cordless telephone conversation could be considered in conjunction
with the anonymous phone call in order to support a finding of
probable cause, all these fail to pass muster under the AguilarSpinelli test. Furthermore, even if all three were considered under
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the "totality of the circumstances" test applicable to the fourth

amendment, the complete lack of corroboration and unreliability
inherent in all three pieces of evidence fall far short of providing
the substantial basis required to find that probable cause exists.
ARGUMENT
I. PETITIONER ENJOYS A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HIS STUDENT RECORDS AND THEREFORE
HAS STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE SEARCH OF THOSE
RECORDS UNDER STATE AND FEDERAL LAW.
The Petitioner enjoys a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
student records which is recognized under the Family Education
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, the Marshall Constitution and the
United States Constitution. The MBI agent's warrantless search of
Petitioner's student records and subsequent seizure of the anonymous letter contained therein constitute an unreasonable violation
of Petitioner's right to privacy in violation of the Marshall Constitution, the United States Constitution and the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 and therefore, must be suppressed.
Accordingly, they cannot be used to support a finding of probable
12 cause to issue the search warrant.i
A.

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act Of 1974 Is A
Legitimate Source Of Petitioner's Expectation Of Privacy In His
Student Records.

The appellate court erred in concluding that simply because
the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g (Supp. IV 1980), (FERPA), does not embody an express or
implied private cause of action, a student has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his student records. FERPA was enacted to assure students "access to their education records and to protect such
individuals right to privacy by limiting the transferability [and disclosure] of their records without their consent." Rios v. Read, 73
F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (citing 120 Cong. Rec. S. 2187) (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 1974) (joint remarks of Sen. Buckley and Sen. Pell, co-sponsors of FERPA). No better evidence than the express congressional
purpose of a statute exists to reaffirm the legitimacy of Petitioner's
expectation of privacy.
The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the existence of
express or implied private causes of action is not determinative of
whether privacy rights are implicated in a statutory scheme. Seattle
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984). In that case, a state
procedural rule was deemed to have recognized an implicit privacy
expectation because it established a significant means of restricting
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otherwise liberal discovery rules. Id. at 2208 n.21. See Wash. Super.
Ct. C.R. 26(c). Specifically, Rule 26(c) enabled the Washington
courts to issue protective orders "for good cause shown" by the
party seeking to bar or limit the release of information. Id. at 2208.
The court summed up the source of the privacy interest when it
stated that "[a]lthough the Rulei contains no specific reference to 13
privacy or to other rights or interest that may be implicated, such
matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the
Rule." Id. at 2208 n.21.
In comparison, FERPA requires that schools and agencies keep
a list of all persons who have sought or received access to student
records and "which will indicate specifically the legitimate interest
that each such person . . . has in obtaining this information." 20
U.S.C § 1232g(b)(4)(A). Not only do the "good cause shown" and
"legitimate interest" standards closely parallel each other, but
FERPA goes a step farther and allows a student the right to edit his
file if it contains any information which is in "violation of the privacy or other rights of the student." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(2). In
view of these procedural rights, it is irrational to deny that the express purposes and impact of FERPA do not serve as an acknowledgement of the reasonable and legitimate privacy interest
Petitioner expects in his education records.
The case law interpreting FERPA emphatically underscores
the student's privacy interest operative within the statute. In Rios
v. Read, 73 F.R.D. 589 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court addressed the question of whether information contained in FERPA-protected education records could be disclosed in order to satisfy a motion to
compel answers to interrogatories under Rule 37(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that judicial approval of the release of the records made "the privacy violations
. . . no less objectionable . . . unless, before approval [was] given,
the party seeking disclosure [was] required to demonstrate a genuinei need for the information that outwiegh[ed] the privacy inter- 14
ests of the students." Rios, 73 F.R.D. at 599. See also In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Served Upon New York Law School, 448 F. Supp.
822, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (student allowed to intervene as a matter of
right in a lawsuit in which his education records were properly subpoened under FERPA, in order to prevent damage to his vital interest in the privacy of the records).
The courts' concern for the privacy expectations of students
starkly contrasts with Agent Collins' unilateral decision that Petitioner's records were "discoverable" without judicial limitation.
The exercise of such arbitrary and unfettered discretion by a law
enforcement officer does not require an express or implied private
cause of action to effectively sanction this abuse of position.
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In light of the strong Congressional policy underlying FERPA,
Petitioner's privacy interest at issue here is readily distinguishable
from the depositor's assertion of legitimate expectation of privacy
in his bank records in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976),
which was erroneously held to be controlling by the court below.
(R. 5, 6).
The threshold question in any case in which the standing of a
person's claim to protection under article I, section 6, of the Marshall Constitution or the fourth amendment of the United States
Constitution is at issue is whether that person has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978);
Miller, 425 U.S. at 440. The generally accepted test requires a showing "first, that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec15 tation ofi privacy and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable.'" Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan J., concurring).
In a situation where the university kept all-inclusive education
records concerning its students, Petitioner unequivocably displayed
his subjective expectation of privacy in his file when he refused to
sign the written consent form required under FERPA. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.30(a)(1), (c), (d); (R. 3,4). The suggestion that Petitioner lacked a subjective expectation of privacy is
ludicrous given the stringent disclosure restrictions on third parties'
access when a student refuses to give his written consent. In this
case, the only means of obtaining access to his student records
would require a "judicial order or. . .subpoena, upon the condition
that . ..[he was] notified of all such orders or subpoenas in advance. . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2)(B).
Also, Congress not only recognized Petitioner's subjective expectation of privacy as being "reasonable," but it went so far as to
condition the availability of federal funding on an institution's compliance with FERPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. § 99.1 et seq..
Notwithstanding the apparent success with which Petitioner
satisfies the Katz test, the appellate court's misplaced reliance on
Miller is relatively simple to discredit given a comparison of Miller
and the instant case.
First, the distinct difference between the purpose of the Bank
16 Secrecy Act and the purpose of FERPA is indicative of thel difference between the legitimacy of the privacy interest of a depositor
and that of Petitioner. While the Bank Secrecy Act was designed
"to facilitate the use of a proper and long-standing law enforcement
technique by insuring that records are available when they are
needed," Miller, 425 U.S. at 444 (1975) (footnote omitted), the fun-
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damental purpose of FERPA is protection of privacy. See, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b); 34 C.F.R. § 99.37.
Second, the court in Miller relied heavily upon what it believed
to be the inherently commercial nature of the depositer's bank
records, stressing especially the voluntary act of passing negotiable
instruments in the stream of commerce. Miller, 425 U.S. 442-3. In
contrast, there is no support for a theory that entrusting highly personal, sensitive information to a fiduciary under law somehow parallels the act of writing a check. See, 20 U.S. § 1232g(b)(2); 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g(b)(4)(A) (FERPA provisions imposing affirmative duties
upon administration regarding education records). Any blind adherence to the easily distinguishable Miller "rule" is misplaced and
erroneous.
To deny Petitioner standing to challenge the search of his student records on the basis that he has no legitimate expectation of
privacy frustrates the express policy underlying FERPA. Where
the access of third parties to student records have threatened the
privacy interests of a student, the courts have managed to find a
legitimate source of an expectation of privacy in student records to
protect that interest. This search was a flagrant deprivation of Petitioner's right to the protection of judicial interposition;1 had Agent 17
Collins bothered to request a search warrant, his utter lack of "legitimate cause" could have been uncovered by a detached, neutral
magistrate from the outset. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,104
S. Ct. 2199 (1984); cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge disclosure because he possessed no recognizable right at law and therefore was not deprived of procedural
due process).
The tenuous analogy between Miller and the case at bar drawn
by the appellate court fails in view of the irreconcilable variance of
purpose between FERPA and the Bank Secrecy Act, as well as the
privacy interest inherently protected by FERPA. Because Petitioner plainly has a legitimate expectaton of privacy in his education records, the appellate court erred in finding Miller to be
controlling under article I, section 6 and the fourth amendment.
B.

Petitioner Has A Legitimate Expectation of Privacy Under The
Greater Protections Granted By Article I, Section Six Of The
Marshall Constitution.

States are free to impose a higher standard for the scrutiny of
searches and seizures under their own state constitution. Cooper v.
California,386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). When a state constitution contains an express provision not contained in the federal constitution,
state court jurists should be wary of simply mirroring the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution
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absent "good evidence that the framers acted without a serious prescriptive intention and inserted human rights language into the
state constitution merely for its rhetorical value." See Kelman,
18 Rediscovering the State ConstitutionalBill of Rights,i 27 Wayne L.
Rev. 413, 414 (1981). Article I, section 6, unlike its federal counterpart, contains express language prohibiting "invasions of privacy."
Mar. Const. art. I, § 6 (1971).
The appellate court's summary dismissal of Petitioner's claim
to a privacy interest in his student records under the Marshall Constitution was improvident, particularly in view of Massachusetts v.
Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085 (1984), and People v. Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d
430, 452 N.E.2d 85 (1983). This perfunctory review was precisely the
sort of disregard of the state's role as the "primary guardian of the
liberty of the people" for which Justice Stevens admonished the
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct.
2085, 2091 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens chastised the court for resolving the issues by means of the minimum
fourth amendment guarantees instead of basing its decision upon its
own state constitution as required by the principles of federalism
and reservation of rights to the people embodied in the ninth
amendment. Upton, 104 S. Ct. at 2089-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
In light of the directive of Upton, it is instructive to look to
People v. Jackson, in which Illinois rejected the Supreme Court's
Miller analysis. In Jackson, the court construed article I, section 6
of the Illinois Constitution, which is identical to article I, section 6
of our Constitution, to grant protection of a depositor's reasonable
expectation of privacy in her bank records. Jackson, 116 Ill. App.3d
at 434-35, 452 N.E.2d at 88-89. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S.
19 435 (1975). Logic dictates that this Court shouldi attribute more
weight to a sister state's interpretation of parallel protective
clauses, than to the Supreme Court's construction of the federal
counterpart which lacks "this express proscription against invasion
of privacy." Jackson, 116 Ill. App. 3d at 434, 452 N.E.2d at 88.
The court in Jackson felt it was duty bound to offer "protection
for the reasonable expectation of privacy which [Illinois] citizens
have in their bank records," id. at 88-89, precisely because of the
additional state constitutional provisions. In reaching its decision,
the court expressly rejected the Miller determination that opening
a bank account constituted "a waiver of an expectation of privacy."
Id.
Illinois is not alone in rejecting the Miller analysis. In varying
factual contexts, California has reached the same conclusion. See
Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1974), bank records; People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602

1985]

Privacy Rights in the Cordless Telephone

P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979), credit records; People v. Mejia, 95
Cal. App. 3d 828, 157 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1979), telephone records.
Two states with constitutional provisions similar to the fourth
amendment, see Pa. Const. art. I, § 8; Col. Const. art. II, § 7, have
embraced the inherent logic of Burrows and have found legitimate
expectations of privacy in bank records. Commonwealth v. DeJohn,
486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979); Charnesv. DiGiacomo,200 Colo. 94,
612 P.2d 1117 (1980).
In view of the states which have exercised their role as the
principal guardians of their citizen's liberty interests, the appellate
court was wrong to ignore the extra protections afforded by our
state constitution. Where "invasions ofi privacy" are expressly pro- 110
scribed by our state, it is erroneous to rely upon the faulty reasoning in United States v. Miller.
Under Burrows analysis, since it is reasonable for depositors to
expect protection from disclosure of the contents of their bank
records, which reveal aspects of their "personal affairs, opinion,
habit and associations which provide a current biography of [their]
activities," the inappropriate disclosure to third parties of a student's record is equally or more revealing and is therefore just as
intolerable an invasion of privacy as the disclosure of ordinary bank
records. Article I, section 6 must be held to protect Petitioner's privacy interest in this context, lest its specific prohibitions be rendered meaningless.
C.

The Emanations From The Penumbra Of Rights Implicit In The
Concept Of Ordered Liberty Protect Petitioner's Student Records
From Warrantless, Arbitrary Intrusions By State Investigators
Under The Due Process Clause Of The Fourteenth Amendment.

The course of history reflects the judiciary's reliance upon the
emanations from one or more of the rights specifically enumerated
under the federal constitution as the means for identifying other
protected interests which are fundamental to our concept of a democratic and civilized society. One such right is the amorphous right
of privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), which applies to the individual states through the liberty protections under
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
Petitioner's situation is no differnet from countless others who
have sought and received relief from an impartial1 judiciary, espe- 111
cially where prior decisions have not squarely addressed the harms
they incurred. Within such a case-by-case framework, the recognition of rights of privacy by the federal court constitute an independent, persuasive basis for redressing Petitioner's state-inflicted
injuries. For this reason the Appellate Court's myopic interpreta-
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tion of the ratio decedendi in Griswold is erroneous. The lower
courts decision completely disregards an individual's privacy interest in the non-disclosure of his personal affairs which was set forth
in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-84, and more fully explored in Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
At issue in Whalen was a statutory scheme requiring the compilation of a central registry containing the names of patients receiving certain narcotics under prescriptions. The patients asserted
that their right to anonymity could be implicated if their names
were improperly divulged. They feared that, if their legitimate
drug use was made public knowledge, they would bear the stigma of
drug addiction. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 595, 600. However, no breaches
of the procedural safeguards built into the New York system to prevent against unwarranted disclosures were proven by the plaintiffs.
Id. at 601. On this basis, the court determined that the state's compelling interests in public health and preventing the abuse of dangerous drugs overrode the plaintiffs' interest in non-disclosure, and
the statute was upheld. Id. at 603-04. But the court expressly reserved the question of whether under different circumstances or
where actual harm has occurred in fact, the ever-increasing ac112 cumulation ofi. highly personal information and the potential for its
abuse would justify an opposite result. Id. at 605-06.
Petitioner lacks the proof problems inherently fatal to the
plaintiffs in Whalen. His personal biography was placed before a
state investigator who lacked any legal right to obtain access to Petitioner's student records. FERPA was encated for the express purpose of protecting students from unwarranted intrusions into the
private matters contained in their student files. While the Dean
breached his fiduciary duties under FERPA by not preventing the
agent's fishing expedition, Officer Collins' further use of the contents of the file irreparably exacerbated the initial injury. Petitioner's fundamental right to non-disclosure is further buttressed
by the protections in FERPA and the unlawful invasion of his privacy must be vindicated.
1.

The first amendment protects Petitioner'sright to
association and the State's use of membership lists to
implicate Petitionerin a crime is a patent abuse of
official authority.

The freedoms we enjoy in our society are contingent upon our
continued ability to associate with whomever we choose without the
constant fear of furtive, unsupervised governmental scrutiny. The
unilateral abrogation of Petitioner's right of association by Officer
Collins squarely confronts this protection embodied in the first
amendment speech and assembly clause. No legitimate challenge to
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Petitioner's standing to raise this constitutional issue can be mustered; where the blatant exploitation of his associational ties led directly to the deprivation of his personal liberty, his right to protect
his private life from illegal invasions by theL state is at its zenith. 113
See Shelton v. Tucker, 346 U.S. 479 (1960). See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 461-66 (1958) ("Inviobility of privacy in group
association may. . . be indispensible to preservation of freedom of
association.").
The entire series of Officer Collins' chilling actions began when
he utilized the student records of Ross and Cooper to key him into
potential targets for his unfocused "investigation." In his desperation to locate "suspects", Officer Collins was reduced to matching
names of other students which were included in each of the two
files, with the hope that he could find some shred of information
about any student which would justify the continuation of an inquiry. (R. 2). Because Petitioner belonged to the same campus organizations and social fraternity as the other two students, he was
unfortunate enough to satisfy the agent's ad hoc criteria, and his
education records were the next to be purged. (R. 2).
This covert activity took place despite the blanket of protection
against any illegitimate disclosures of the contents of student
records under FERPA. The statute seeks to preserve the vital role
schools serve as one of the principal forums for the exchange of
ideas, the expansion of knowledge through inquiry and exposure to
new concepts, and the acquisition of the social skills needed to accommodate disparate lifestyles in our heterogeneous nation. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). Where
governmental activity intrudes upon these special interests, it is
subjected to the most exacting scrutiny for "[t]he vigilant protection
of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vitall than in the com- 114
munity of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960).
In Shelton, an Arkansas statute requiring teachers in the state
schools to disclose the names of any groups with which teachers
were affiliated was declared to be unconstitutional. Central to the
court's resolution was its staunch affirmance that "scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to
evaluate." Id. at 487 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 240).
It is impossible to distinguish the potential chilling effect recognized in Shelton from the actual injury that Petitioner has sustained. Prior to Officer Collins' random selection of criminal
suspects from student files, he was unaware of Petitioner's existence. Upon finding the anonymous letter, Petitioner suddenly be-
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came the focal point of the agent's attention. Had a court of law
been allowed to review the agent's initial suspicions of the University students, his survey of suspects would have been checked at its
inception. Petitioner does not claim that his first amendment freedom is an absolute right. But Petitioner vehemently denies that the
state possesses the power to investigate his associational ties without first seeking and obtaining the approval of an impartial magistrate. Any holding to the contrary would effectively force students
to scrutinize the acquaintances with the utmost care in order to
avoid being stigmatized by the insinuation of misconduct or impropriety. "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers
shed their constitutional rights to freedom or expression at the
115 schoolhousel gate." Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). The restrictions on access
to student records under FERPA reflects congressional concern for
the right of privacy implicit in the first amendment. The result of
any dilution of FERPA safeguards is a chilling effect on students'
right to association. A firm statement by this Court is needed to
emphasize that the flaunting of official authority in the face of this
deleterious effect on legitimate privacy expectations can not be
tolerated.
2. Petitoner's reasonableexpectation of privacy in his
student records was violated under the fourth
amendment by the MBI agent's warrantlesssearch.
FERPA exemplifies society's recognition of a student's reasonable expectation of privacy in his education records which is violated by any nonconsensual and/or procedurally defective
disclosure of the file's contents. This law merely gives import to the
meaning of "effects" as expressed in the fourth amendment. To
draw distinctions between files retained in one's home versus those
entrusted to another in this instance would be ludicrous. Where
the records relate to information of an indisputably detailed, personal nature, the unauthorized rifling of that file can be deemed
nothing less than a violation of the subjective and objective expectations of privacy of the student affected. Petitioner had no more intent to expose his private affairs to unknown persons than did the
hapless caller in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, in which the
Supreme Court declared that ". . . what he seeks to preserve as pri116 vate, even in an area accessible to thel public, may be constitutionally protected." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351-52.
This is true because the "Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places." Id. at 351. Here, Petitioner's refusal to execute a consent form was the only measure he could employ to safeguard his
education records against warrantless intrusions. Where a student
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takes the normal steps to protect strictly private information, he
fully manifests his reasonable expectation of privacy in its continuing confidentiality. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
Thus, without a warrant, Officer Collins' search of Petitioner's
file was per se unreasonable. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1973).
There are only a few narrow exceptions to this well-established
rule, one of which is consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973). This limited consent exception allows a third party to
consent to a search under very limited circumstances. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
In Petitioner's case, the Appellate Court summarily determined that the Dean's ostensible authority to consent to searches
of student files somehow legitimized the conduct of Officer Collins.
(R. 6). The lower court's unsubstantiated conclusion that these circumstances could be pigeonholed into the narrow limits of the consent exception exemplifies its misapprehension of what serves as
legal third-party consent under the state and federal constitutions.
Here, the record unambiguously discloses that Dean Drummer
possessed no actual authority to divulge the entire contents of Petitioner's student file. (R. 6). Certainly hel had Petitioner's implied 117
or express permission to use Petitioner's education records to perform his administrative tasks. But this limited authority cannot be
stretched to allow the ransacking of a student's file by a state agent
in the absence of the student's prior written consent or a valid judicial order or subpoena. 20 U.S. § 1232g(b)(2)(A), (B).
Under even the federal minimum standards of good faith, the
legal fiction of apparent authority has no validity in instances
where a police officer should have known that a third party lacked
the authority to consent to a search. Hotel proprietors do not possess the actual or apparent authority to permit searches of hotel
rooms for weapons or other contraband where no warrant has been
obtained. Stoner v. California,376 U.S. 483 (1964). Nor can a lessor
grant permission for others to enter his leased premises if the purpose of the entry exceeds the owner's limited retained rights of access. Chapman v. United States, 356 U.S. 610 (1961); State v.
Zindros, 189 Conn. 228, 456 A.2d 288 (1983). Cf. United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (mistress sharing room with defendant
gave valid consent to a search).
Our Marshall Constitution adds an extra layer of protection
against unreasonable searches with the prohibition against "invasions of privacy." The state cannot come before this Court and argue that Officer Collins' ignorance of the mandates of FERPA
should serve as an excuse for his actions. If consent by Dean Drummer is categorized as the sort that vitiates the search warrant requirements, then entire statutory schemes can be abrogated with
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impunity. It cannot be said that Congress's interest in the efficacy
118 of its lawsl gives way to the mere whim of state actors. The State of
Marshall must not be allowed to profit from the illegitimate and
illegal conduct of its law enforcement officers and university
officials.
The exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment, as a minimum guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures in the form of a deterrent safeguard, is equally applicable
under article I, section 6. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This
rule of law simply but firmly requires that evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution "shall not be used at all." Id. at 268.
It follows that the same principles cause the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to be applicable under our state constitution.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The anonymous
letter, seized as a result of the MBI agent's illegal search of Petitioner's student files, is thus considered "tainted" as the product of
illegal actions, id. at 488, and cannot be considered in a determination of probable cause to issue a warrant. Therefore where constitutional rights have been conveniently suspended by state actors,
the exclusionary rule will serve as a swift and fair reminder that
such conduct is impermissible.
II. PETITIONER HAS A LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY IN HIS CORDLESS TELEPHONE
COMMUNICATIONS AND THEREFORE HAS STANDING
TO CHALLENGE THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE OF HIS
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION UNDER STATE AND
FEDERAL LAW.
The Petitioner enjoys a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
cordless telephone conversations which is recognized under the
Marshall Constitution, the United States Constitution and Title III
119 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safel Streets Act of 1968. The
MBI agent's warrantless interception of Petitioner's private communications over a cordless telephone constitutes an unreasonable
violation of Petitioner's right to privacy. The evidence obtained in
violation of the Marshall Constitution, the United States Constitution and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 must be suppressed and cannot be used to support a
finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant. Therefore,
the decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court's order to suppress
the evidence must be reinstated.
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Article I, Section 6 Affords Its Citizens Greater Protection Than
Its Federal Counterpart And Consequently, Petitioner Has A
Legitimate Expectation of Privacy In his Cordless Telephone
Communications.

Petitioner's legitimate expectation of privacy in his cordless telephone communications must first be analyzed in accordance with
the fundamental principles underlying article I, section 6. See Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
120
concurring).
Both the Illinois and Marshall Constitutions contain express
prohibitions against "invasions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means." Ill. Const.
art. I, § 6 (1970); Mar. Const. art. I, § 6 (1971). Therefore, Illinois
law is persuasive in analyzing article I, section 6 of our constitution.
("[S]ection 6 was drafted to prohibit interceptions of communications by using new forms of technology unforeseeable in 1970.").
See Ill. Ann. Stat., 1970 Const., Art. I, sec. 6, Constitutional Commentary, 317, 318 (Smith-Hurd 1971).1
In People v. Giannopoulos, 20 Ill. App. 3d 338, 314 N.E.2d 237
(1974), the court formulated a test to determine whether there was
a violation of article I, section 6. In essence, the test looks to
whether the defendant's conversation was "intercepted," and if so,
whether it was accomplished by "eavesdropping devices or other
means." Id. at 343, 314 N.E.2d at 240. Assuming these two elements
are met, then it must be determined whether the interception was
"unreasonable" and therefore violative of article I, section 6. Id. As
incorporated in the Giannopoulos test, an "interception" occurs
when there is a third party to the communication and neither party
has consented to the "eavesdropping." Id.
Using this analysis, the MBI agents' monitoring and tape-recording of Petitioner's cordless telephone conversation constitutes a
non-consensual "interception." The appellate court's interpretation
of the use of a cordless telephone as a knowing consent to the interception of communications has no basis in fact and constitutes a
meritless abrogation of the express protection Marshall citizens enjoy against the inevitable invasions of privacy which accompany
technological advancements. It is obvious that the framers intended for article I, section 6 protection to extend to technological
innovations utilized by citizens. It is equally evident that the MBI
agents were not invited "parties" to the communication, as the appellate court's strained interpretation of consent collapses under its
own weight. When the MBI agents staked-out Petitioner's home
far enough away to escapel detection, yet close enough to tune into 121
the limited range of signals emanating from the hand-held unit to
the base unit inside the house, a non-consensual "interception" oc-
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curred. The use of a radio and a tape-recorder undoubtedly constitutes the use of an "eavesdropping device." Finally, the
"unreasonableness" of this interception is indisputable since interceptions "which are made without the consent of at least one party
. . . are unconstitutional." People v. Childs, 67 Ill. App. 3d 473, 475,

385 N.E.2d 147, 149 (1979).
Illinois is not the only state to afford its citizens greater protection in their private communications than does the federal constitution. States whose constitutional provisions do not contain nearly
as strong or express a proscription against interceptions of communications and even states whose constitutional provisons are nearly
verbatim renditions of the federal constitution have construed their
respective constitutions as affording their citizens more protection.
See, e.g., State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 879 (Alaska 1978) (Alaska's
privacy amendment to constitution prohibits secret electronic monitoring of conversations even with the consent of participant); State
v. Brackman, 582 P.2d 1216 (Mont. 1978) (state constitution prohibits secret broadcast of conversation by a participant to the police
unless a compelling state interest is shown); People v. Deavers, 393
Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511 (1975) (use of electronic device by a participant in the conversation thereby transmitting incriminating
statements made by defendant in his own home to police outside of
home is unconstitutional without search warrant); White v. Davis,
122 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975)1 (secret tape
recording of students' discussions in private and public meetings
and in university classrooms by police disguised as students constituted violation of state constitutional privacy amendment); Quinto
v. City and Borough of Juneau, 664 P.2d 630 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983)
(non-consensual tape-recording of pre-arrest conversation between
citizen and uniformed law enforcement officers requires search
warrant under state constitution).
These states have given close consideration to their state constitutions and have adopted the principle that "[iun a free society, people ought not to have to watch their every word so carefully." State
v. Glass, 583 P.2d at 877 (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S.
427, 452 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting)). Acting on the principles
of federalism and the reservation of rights to their citizens under
the ninth amendment, Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2091
(1984) (Stevens, J., concurring), they have heeded the directive of
the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States as it relates to state
protection of privacy rights: "[T]he protection of a person's general
right to privacy-his right to be left alone by other people-is, like
the protection of his property and his very life, left largely to the
law of the individual States." Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis in original). The duty imposed on the Supreme
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Court of Marshall, by viture of the express language of article I,
section 6, requires that the appellate court's finding that Petitioner
123
had no legitimate expectation of privacy be reversed.1
B.

Petitioner Enjoys A Legitimate Expectation Of Privacy Under The
Fourth Amendment Which Was Violated By The MBI Agents'
Warrantless Interception.

The preceding discussion of the interplay of technological advances and zones of privacy highlights the reprehensible nature of
the state's intrusion into Petitioner's home under the proscriptive
mandates of our state constitution. Yet, even under the minimal
standards of the fourth amendment, the agent's actions cannot be
condoned.
It is established that Officer Collins and Officer Brown continuously monitored the comings and goings from Petitioner's house
for a six-day period. (R. 2,3). At the same time, they had their car
radio tuned into an FM frequency. (R. 3). On the sixth day, their
patience was rewarded when they intercepted a small, ambiguous
fragment of a phone conversation originating from Petitioner's
home, which they immediately construed to be incriminating in nature. The following morning, Officer Collins included this occurrence and the content of the conversation in his sworn statement to
the magistrate, believing that his actions were perfectly legitimate.
But what the agents failed to recognize was that their monitoring
was as certain an intrusion into Petitioner's home as if they had
stormed in his front door at the time of the phone conversation.
The fourth amendment is especially intolerant of actions which violate the inner sanctum of one's home. Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1885), and electronic monitoring without a warrant is as
much an illegal entry into one's residence as an actual trespass.
United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984) (electronic monitoringl 124
of a beeper secreted within a container which was subsequently carried into a private home violates the fourth amendment).
The home receives this heightened protection, not on the basis
of property principles, but because there is no better place where
one can reasonably expect to enjoy uninterrupted peace and privacy. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981). Cf.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (no expectation of privacy in automobile). Merely because technology has outstripped
Congressional action, the MBI agents cannot shield themselves
from condemnation by capitalizing on a narrow gap in the law.
Karo, 104 S. Ct. at 3302, 3305. It is impossible to draw a distinction
between the means employed by the Government to pierce through
the walls of Karo's residence and the intentional and successful capture of Petitioner's conversation by the MBI agents. Here, as in
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Karo, the product of the privacy invasion cannot be used to condemn Petitioner.
Warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and since none of the narrow exceptions
are applicable, the interception of Petitioner's private telephone
conversation by the state agents is violative of both state and federal constitutionally protected interests.
The principles which protect Petitioner's right to privacy in regard to his student records under the exclusionary rule are equally
applicable to the unreasonable infringement on his right to be free
from unreasonable interceptions of communications. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961). Unauthorized intrusions by state officials into
125 the privacy ofi one's home have been deemed particularly violative
in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., Steagald, 451 U.S. 204, 221-24 (
1981); United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984). The exclusion of
Petitioner's tape-recorded cordless telephone conversation is
mandatory in view of the basic purpose of the exclusionary rule
which seeks to vindicate individual rights contained in article I, section 6 and the fourth amendment. Therefore, the recorded telephone conversation must be suppressed and cannot be used to
support a finding of probable cause.
C.

Petitioner's Cordless Telephone Conversation Was Intercepted By
the MBI Agents In Violation Of Title III Of The Omnibus Crime
Control And Safe Streets Act Of 1968.

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (1976), (Title III), was enacted by Congress to strike a balance between the privacy interests of citizens
and the needs of law enforcement, particularly to combat organized
crime. See Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 1968 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 257 (Congressional findings). Congress proposed that
if organized crime was exploiting technology, then law enforcement
should be able to utilize the same technology in the interests of justice. However, in order to protect the privacy of communications of
the public, Congress imposed safeguards on the use of electronic
surveillance. Id. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2515, 2516. Title III contains
a broad statutory exclusionary rule intended to deter abuse of technology by providing that whenever wire or oral communications are
126 intercepted in violation of Title III, "no part of the contents of suchi
communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received
in evidence in any trial . . . or other proceeding in or before any
court . . . of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision
thereof. . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2515. Because the MBI agents intercepted
Petitioner's cordless telephone conversation without prior judicial
authorization in violation of Title III, the substance of that conver-
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sation can not be used to support a finding of probable cause and the
contraband seized as a result must be suppressed as well. 18 U.S.C.

§ 2515.
1.

The nature of communications transmitted by use of
a cordless telephone are properly characterizedas a
"wire communication" under Title II.

The threshold question in determining the applicability of Title
III to the interception of communications is whether the communications fall within the definition of "wire" or "oral" communications under section 2510. 18 U.S.C. § 2510. "Oral" communications
are protected when a person exhibits "an expectation that such
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). "Wire" communications are defined as "any communication made in whole or in part
through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications
by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point
of origin and the point of reception. . ." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1).
The congressional policy underlying Title III would not be
served by refusing to classify a cordless telephone as a wire communication. In United States v. Hall, 488 F.2d 1931 (9th Cir. 1973), the 127
court was compelled to classify a radio-telephone conversation as a
"wire" communication under § 2510(1) due to the plain language
contained therein and the express legislative history stating that
coverage of "wire communications" was "intended to be comprehensive." Id. at 197 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2178).
The court in Hall determined that where the statute expressly
included communications carried over wire, in part, the decision to
exclude radio telephones rested solely with Congress' power. Id. at
198. Therefore, the appellate court's assumption that the cordless
telephone conversation was an "oral communication" is at odds
with its characterization of the communications as "radio broadcasts from the mobile unit held by the user to the base unit which
then transmits the signals over conventional telphone lines." (R. 7).
Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2501(1) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the difference between the operation of radio
and cordless telephones lends support to the classification of cordless telephone conversations as "wire communications." Whereas
radio telephones transmit signals from the user's location to a centralized mobile telephone network receiver, which are then transmitted over conventional telephone lines, id. at 195, 197,
Petitioner's cordless telephone operates by transmitting signals
from the hand-held unit to the base unit, both of which are located
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in Petitioner's home. From the base unit, signals are then carried
128 over conventional telephones lines.i
This distinction between radio and cordless telephones is one
the court in State v. Howard, 679 P.2d 197 (Kan. 1983), failed to
make. The court tried to justify its rejection of Hall on the basis of
the Title III criminal and civil penalties for interception, Howard,
679 F.2d at 205, but failed to point out that those penalties require
specific intent in order to deter intentional invasions of privacy. 18
U.S.C. § 2511. Accordingly, Howard should be afforded much less
weight than the strict statutory construction properly utilized in
Hall. Therefore, Petitioner's cordless telephone conversation
should be characterized as a "wire" communication under section
2510(1).
2. Petitionerhas a justifiable expectation of privacy in
his cordless telephone conversation under Title III.
"Oral" communications are defined as "any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectations." 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). This requires
"the speaker to have a subjective expectation of privacy that is objectively reasonable." United States v. Rose, 669 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir.
1982).
No evidence has been introduced which proves that Petitioner
did not expect the exact degree of privacy in his cordless telephone
conversations as he did in his conventional telephone conversations.
(R. 4). Cf. State v. Howard, 679 F.2d at 206 (owners manual fully
advised owners of a certain brand of cordless telephone of its limited broadcast nature.)
The appellate court has held, in effect, that citizens who expect
129 to hold private telephone conversations withini their own homes
must sacrifice technological advances for the price of the protection
of a judicial system that is not ready to reconcile concepts of what is
"reasonable" in the modern world with what is "realistic" in the
modern world. Cf. United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303
(1984) (beeper smuggled into plaintiff's home violated his expectation of privacy). However, the judiciary is uniquely equipped to
keep apace of this modern-day technological explosion, and its statutory interpretation must consider the realistic impact of new
developments.
This is especially true when law enforcement officers take advantage of legislative and judicial loopholes caused by technological
progress with unbridled discretion in order to seize information
that would not otherwise be available to them. Title III was originally enacted to enable law enforcement officers to combat the use

1985]

Privacy Rights in the Cordless Telephone

of illegal eavesdropping devices by organized crime. But where a
cordless telephone is used legally within the confines of a citizen's
home the overriding law enforcement interest is simply not
present.
Under these facts, the appellate court erred in failing to heed
Congressional intent to protect the preeminent privacy expectations of individuals. Accordingly, no part of Petitioner's cordless
telephone conversaton may be used to support a finding of probable
cause, and the contrabrand seized as a result of the unauthorized
130
interception must be suppressed.1
III.

WHETHER REVIEWED UNDER THE AGUILAR/SPINELLI
TEST OR UNDER THE GATES TEST, THE TWO
ANONYMOUS TIPS AND THE RECORDED TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION DO NOT PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIAL
BASIS TO SUPPORT THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE.

This court is the final arbiter of the import of the express language of article I, section 6. The explicit recognition of the right of
privacy is eliminated by judicial fiat unless the standard for determining probable cause remains stringent enough to obviate the potential for undue invasions of privacy.
A. The Aguilar/Spinelli Test Is The Proper Standard By Which To
Evaluate Informant's Tips As Supporting A Finding Of Probable Cause
Under Article I, section 6.
The Appellate Court was derelict in its duty to the constitution
and people of the State of Marshall when it sua sponte declared that
Aguilar/Spinelli test for probable cause to issue a warrant lost its
vitality as the proper standard under our state system of criminal
justice. The court's breach stems from its failure to keep foremost
in mind that federal rulings in this sensitive area establish only the
minimum standard for resolving issues arising under state constitution. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash.2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). See
Massachusetts v. Upton, 104 S. Ct. 2085, 2091 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). Something more is needed to justify the abrogation of
long-standing state precedent than the fact that the Supreme Court
has chosen to follow a different course under the federal Constitution. Any belief to the contrary assumes that the citizens of our
state engaged in a futile exercise when they adopted article I, section 6, and reduces our state courts to the role of acting as adjuncts
for the federal system. Without a sounder reason than thati given 131
by the appellate court for dismantling the extra layer of protections
included in our state constitutional scheme, this court must con-
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tinue to adhere to the probable cause standard that has promoted
the well-being of the citizenry of Marshall for the last fifteen years.
1. As the only piece of information left which may
properly be considered in a determination of
probable cause, the anonymous telephone call fails
both prongs of the Aguilar/Spinelli test.
The first step in reviewing a finding of probable cause which
rests on an anonymous informant's tip is to determine whether the
magistrate had been adequately "informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded" that the
criminal activity or evidence was present where he claimed it was.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 144 (1964). The anonymous caller
reported that she had seen a cordless telephone in Petitioner's
home, she had heard Petitioner over her radio referring to a "case
of coke," and she suspected him of being a "drug dealer." (R. 2).
Given these three pieces of raw data, the magistrate could only determine that the informant knew first hand of a cordless telephone
and a "case of coke." The magistrate could not, however, logically
find that the informant's bald accusation was based on any personal
knowledge whatsoever, since at best, the informant had merely
jumped to the tenuous conclusion that Petitioner was a "drug
dealer" upon merely hearing him mention a "case of coke." In the
alternative, the magistrate could evaluate the informant's tip based
on the detail describing the criminal activity so that the magistrate
could be sure that "he was relying on something more substantial
132 than al casual rumor ... or an accusation based merely on an individual's reputation." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416
(1968). See, e.g., Winkles v. States, 634 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Crim. 1982)
(although defendant had called the white powdery substance
"speed," the facts were not sufficient to conclude that he was referring to a drug rather than a cleaning powder). The informant's tip
here, however, is devoid of any detail and therefore fails.
But even if the informant's tip had met either of these elements, commonly referred to as the "basis of knowledge" prong of
the Aguilar/Spinelli test, it is patently insufficient to meet the second half of this test. The "veracity" prong requires that the magistrate "be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant ... was 'credible'
or his information 'reliable.' " Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. The 'credibility' of the anonymous caller is impossible to demonstrate, since
she has no "track record" of past performance verifying that her
information is accurate. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 304 (1967).
As to her "reliability," no other circumstances were furnished
which would otherwise guarantee her trustworthiness, such as a
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statement against her penal interest. United States v. Harris,403
U.S. 573, 579-80 (1971). As an alternative, the magistrate could consider any independent investigatory efforts which would lend
credence to the informant's story. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417-18. But
since the independent observations of the MBI agents may not
properly be considered here, the informant's conclusory accusation
cannot be verified at all. Therefore, thel anonymous caller's state- 133
ments are not sufficient to establish probable cause.
4. Given all the evidence available, the magistratestill
did not have a substantial basis under the
Aguilar/Spinelli test to conclude that probable cause
existed.
Even assuming arguendo that other evidence was available to
corroborate the anonymous telephone call, it still fails to meet the
requirements of the Aguilar/Spinelli standard. First, the addition
of the anonymous letter and the recorded telephone conversation
are irrelevant in considering whether the anonymous phone call
meets the "basis of the knowledge" prong; nothing contained in
these two separate pieces of information can help in showing that
the anonymous caller had first hand knowledge upon which to support her suspicion that Petitioner was a "drug dealer." Nor do they
help provide the "self-verifying detail," see Stanley v. State, 19 Md.
App. 508, 313 A.2d 847, 851 (1974), otherwise necessary to show that
the informant was relying on something better than mere rumor or
reputation.
Second, the anonymous telephone call still fails the "veracity"
prong since neither piece of additional evidence is helpful in establishing the anonymous caller's "credibility" or "reliability." As to
independent investigation, the addition of the recorded telephone
conversation in which Petitioner mentioned he had "some good
stuff," (R. 2), falls far short of the degree of corroboration necessary
to "permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's report to
ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being committed."
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 418. As such, it is debatable whetheri the tip 134
should have been taken into consideration in the magistrate's determination at all.
The probative value of the fragment of Petitioner's intercepted
telephone conversation in which he stated that he had "some good
stuff" for sale is equally dubious. In the absence of any additional
evidence indicating that these words were spoken in a drug-related
context, the Petitioner's statement is intrinsically innocent. The
shallowness of the results of the MBI agent's six day surveillance is,
instead, a confirmation of the fact that Petitioner was not involved
in the criminal activity suggested by the anonymous telephone call.
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The only part of the anonymous telephone call that this independent investigation to corroborate established was the fact that Petitioner owned a cordless telephone. Verification of this sort of
innocent activity only shows that perhaps the informant is "not a
total liar," The Supreme Court, 1968 Term. 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7, 181
(1969), and cannot be used to substantiate an otherwise inadequate
tip. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US. 560, 567 (1971).
However, the paucity of probative value of the anonymous
phone call and the recorded telephone conversation pale in comparison to the utter insubstantiability of the anonymous letter, which
labeled the Petitioner a "drug peddler and a menace to the young
people of the community." (R. 2). This is a "bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising
the magistrate's decision." Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 414 (citation omitted). As such, it may not "be used to give additional weight to alle135 gations that would otherwise be insufficient." Id. at 418-19.1
Therefore, it is self-evident that the appellate court erred in
concluding that the magistrate had been presented with a substantial bais for determining the existence of probable cause.
B.

Even A Consideration Of All The Evidence Under The Gates
"Totality of the Circumstances" Standard Fails to Provide A
Substantial Basis For the Magistrate To Conclude That Probable
Cause Existed.

History teaches us that the judiciary, like a pendulum which
has shifted too far to one side, will eventually swing back to middle
ground. Given the strong explicit language of article I, section 6, no
valid reason exists to force the citizens of Marshall to witness the
emasculation of the constitutional protection implicit in article I,
section 6, while the federal courts wait another fifteen years to recognize the fruits of the injustice sure to spring from the "totality of
the circumstances" standard of Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317
(1983). However, if this Court chooses to abandon the Aguilar/Spinelli standard in favor of the Gates "totality of the circumstances" test, the decision of the appellate court must be reversed
since even under the latter standard no substantial basis for a finding of probable cause can be said to exist.
The primary difference between the Gates and Aguilar/Spinelli standard is that under the former, "overkill" on one
prong may cure a deficit on the other prong, see Gates, 103 S. Ct. at
2328, n.5, ifin view of all the evidence presented to the magistrate
he has a "substantial basis for. . . conclud[ing] that probable cause
136 exists. Id. at 2331.1
Under this considerably relaxed standard, the anonymous tips
and the weak corroboration of the MBI agent's independent investi-
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gation fail to provide the "substantial basis" required. Neither of
the anonymous tips provide any basis for determining the source of
their respective accusations that Petitioner was a drug dealer, nor
do they provide any basis for concluding that either of the informants was "either honest or his information reliable." Id. at 2326.
The anonymous letter in Gates, revealed details concerning dates,
times, places, and travel plans of the defendant's drug deal. Id. at
2325. The Supreme Court concluded that this letter, standing
alone, would not provide a sufficient basis for a finding of probable
cause. Id. at 2326. The independent investigation, which corroborated a major part of the details in the letter, id. at 2325-26, and the
self-verifying detail of the letter, viewed as a whole, were instrumental in satisfying the Gates test. Id. at 2336.
Neither of the tips in the instant case contain any detail at all,
and the independent investigation by the MBI agents merely corroborated the existence of a cordless telephone. While the anonymous phone call and the intercepted conversation contained
language which, under a strained construction at best, could be
viewed as corroborating the existence of narcotics as suggested by
the anonymous letter, this is not the method of probable cause determination envisioned by the Supreme Court in Gates. Like the
"'bare bones' affidavits in cases such as Nathanson and Aguilar,"
Officer Collins' sworn statement provided "the magistrate virtually
no basis at all for making a judgment regarding probable cause."1 137
Gates at 2332. In this case, the magistrate has merely acted "as a
rubber stamp for the police." Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 111. Accordingly,
the appellate court's finding that the magistrate had a "substantial
basis for conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed must be
reversed.
Since the invalidation of the warrant renders the search illegal,
the evidence seized as a result of the search must be suppressed.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Petitioner's case is a particularly
appropriate subject for recognizing the continued validity of Mapp,
since the rule was drafted to deny vesting ill-gotten gains with legal
significance. In an instance such as this, where one wrong has been
followed consistently by another, the full force of the exclusionary
rule's deterrence power must be brought to bear. At this belated
date the exclusionary rule is the only remedy which will ameliorate
the substantial injury.
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CONCLUSION
Petitioner Roger Carter respectfully prays that the judgment
of the Appellate Court of the State of Marshall be reversed and the
judgment of the Trial Court of the State of Marshall granting Petitioner's motion to quash and suppress be reinstated for the reasons
set forth above.
Respectfully submitted,

138

Counsel for Petitioneri
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APPENDIX
U.S. Const. amend. I:
Congress shall make up no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. Const. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IX:
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV:
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Mar. Const. art. I, sec. 6:
The People shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy and interceptions of
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The pertinent provision of the Colorado Constitution, article II, section 7 provides in part:

The John Marshall Law Review

IA-1

[Vol. 18:1015

The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures . . . Colo.
Const. art. II, sec. 7.1
The pertinent provision of the Illinois Constitution, article I, section
6 provides:
The people shall have the right to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable
searches, seizures, invasions of privacy and interceptions of
communications by eavesdropping devices or other means. No
warrant shall issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Ill. Const. art. I, sec. 6.
The pertinent provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution, article I,
section 7 provides in part:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures...
Pa. Const. art. I, sec. 8.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, 18 U.S.C. section 2510 et. seq., provides in pertinent part:
§ 2510. Definitions
As used in this chapter(1) "wire communication" means any communication
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the
transmission of communications by aid of wire, cable, or other
like connection between the point of origin and the point of
reception furnished or operated by any such person engaged as
a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for
the transmission of interstate or foreign communications;
(2) "oral communication" means any oral communication
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances
justifying such expectation...
§ 2511.

IA-2

Interception and disclosure of wire or oral communications prohibited.
(1) Exept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter any person who(a) willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication;1
(b) willfully uses, endeavors to use, or procures any
other person to use or endeavor to use any electronic,
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mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral communication when(ii) such device transmits communications by radio,
or interferes with the transmission of such communication;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.
§ 2515.

Prohibition of use as evidence of intercepted wire or
oral communications.

Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication and no
evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, officer, agency, regulatory body, legislative
committee, or other authority of the United States, a State, or a
political subdivision thereof if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this chapter.
§ 2516.

Authorization for interception of wire or oral
communications.

(2) The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or
the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision
thereof, if such attorney is authorized by a statute of that State
to make application to a State court judge of competent jurisdiction for an order authorizing or approving the interception
of wire or oral communications, may apply to such judge for,
and such judge may grant in conformity with section 2518 of
this chapter and with the applicable State statute an order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire and oral communications by investigative or law enforcement officers
having responsibility for the investigation of the offense as to
which the application is made, when such interception may
provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of murder, kidnapping, gambling, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic drugs, marihuana or other
dangerous drugs, or other crime dangerous to life, limb, or
property, and punishable by imprisonment for more than one
year, designated in any applicable State statute authorizing
such interception, or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
offenses.
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1232g, provides in pertinent part:
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(a)(1)(A) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program toi any educational agency or institution which
has a policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a school
of such agency or at such institution, as the case may be, the
right to inspect and review the education records of their children. If any material or document in the education record of a
student includes information on more than one student, the
parents of one of such students shall have the right to inspect
and review only such part of such material or document as relates to such student or to be informed of the specific information contained in such part of such material. Each educational
agency or institution shall establish appropriate procedures for
granting of a request by parents for access to the education
records of their children within a reasonable period of time, but
in no case more than forty-five days after the request has been
made.
(2) No funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution unless the
parents of students who are or have been in attendance at a
school of such agency or at such institution are provided an opportunity for a hearing by such agency institution, in accordance with regulations of the Secretary, to challenge the content
of such student's education records, in order to insure that the
records are not inaccurate, misleading, or otherwise in violation
of the privacy or other rights of students, and to provide an opportunity for the correction or deletion of any such inaccurate,
misleading, or otherwise inappropiate data contained therein
and to insert into such records a written explanation of the parents respecting the content of such records.
(4)(A) For the purposes of this section, the term "education records means, except as may be provided in subparagraph
(B), those records, files, documents, and other materials
which(i) contain information directly related to a student;
and
(ii) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution.
(5)(A) For the purposes of this section the term "directory information" relating to a student includes the following:
the student's name, address, telephone listing, date and place of
birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized
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activities and sports, weight and height of members of athletic
teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, and
the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student.
(B) Any educational agency or institution making public directory information shall give public notice of the categories of information which it has designated as such information
with respect to each student attending the institution or agency
and shall allow a reasonable period of time after such notice
has been given for a parent to inform the institution or agency
that any or all of the information designated should not be released without the parent's prior consent.
(b)(2) No funds shall be available under any applicable program to any educational agency or institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any
personally identifiable information in education records other
than directory information, or as is permitted under paragraph
(1) of this subsection unless(A) there is written consent from the student's parents specifyingi records to be released, the reasons for iA-4
such release, and to whom, and with a copy of the records
to be release to the student's parents and the student if desired by the parents, or
(B) such information is furnished in compliance with
judicial order, or pursuant to any lawfully issued subpoena,
upon condition that parents and the students are notified
of all such orders or subpoenas in advance of the compliance therewith by the educational institution or agency.
(4)(A) Each educational agency or institution shall maintain a record, kept with the education records of each student,
which will indicate all individuals (other than those specified in
paragraph (1)(A) of this subsection), agencies, or organizations
which have requested or obtained access to a student's education records maintained by such educational agency or institution, and which will indicate specifically the legitimate interest
that such person, agency, or organization has in obtaining this
information. Such record of access shall be available only to
parents, to school officials and his assistants' who are responsible for the custody of such records, and to persons or organizations authorized in, and under the conditions of, clauses
(A) and (C) of paragraph (1) as a means of auditing the operation of the system.
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(B) With respect to this subsection, personal information shall be transferred to a third party on the condition that
such party will not permit any other party to have access to
such information without the written consent of the parents of
the student.
(d) For the purpose of this section, whenever a student has
attained eighteen years of age, or is attending an institution of
postsecondary education the permission or consent required of
and the rights accorded to the parents of the student shall
thereafter only be required of and accorded to the student.
(e) No funds shall be made available under any applicable
program to any educational agency or institution unless such
agency or institution informs the parents of students, or the
students, if they are eighteen years of age or older, or are attending an institution of postsecondary education, of the rights
accorded them by this section.
The regulations promulgated under 20 U.S.C. § 1232g, Privacy
Rights of Parents and Students, 34 C.F.R. § 99 et. seq., provide in
pertinent part:
§ 99.3 Definitions.
As used in this part:
"Directory information" includes the following information relating to a student: The student's name, address, telephone
number, date and place of birth, major field of study, participation in officially recognized activities and sports, weight and
height of members of athletic teams, dates of attendance, degrees and awards received, the most recent previous educational agency or institution attended by the student, and other
similar information.

iA-5

"Education records" (a) means those records which: (1) Are
directly related to student, and (2) are maintained by an educational agency or institution or by a party acting for the agency
or institution.
. . .1
"Eligible student" means a student who has attained eighteen
years of age, or is attending an institution of postsecondary
education.
"Personally identifiable" means that the data or information
includes (a) the name of the student, the student's parent, or
other family member, (b) the address of the student, (c) a per-
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sonal identifier, such as the student's social security number or
student number, (d) a list of personal characteristics which
would make the student's identity easily traceable, or (e) other
information which would make the student's identity easily
traceable.
§ 99.4 Student rights.
(a) For the purposes of this part, whenever a student has attained eighteen years of age, or is attending an institution of
postsecondary education, the rights accorded to and the consent
required of the parent of the student shall thereafter only be
accorded to and required of the eligible student.
§ 99.5 Formulation of institutional policy and procedures.
(a) Each educational agency or institution shall, consistent
with the minimum requirements of section 438 of the Act and
this part, formulate and adopt a policy of(1) Informing parents of students or eligible students
of their rights under § 99.6;
(2) Permitting parents of students or eligible students to inspect and review the education records of the
student in accordance with § 99.11, including at least:
(i) A statement of the procedure to be followed
by a parent or an eligible student who requests to inspect
and review the education records of the sudent;
(ii) With an understanding that it may not deny
access to an education record, a description of the circumstances in which the agency or institution feels it has a legitimate cause to deny a request for a copy of such records;
(iii) A schedule of fees for copies, and
(iv) A listing of the types and locations of educational records maintained by the educational agency or institution and the titles and addresses of the officials
responsible for those records;
(3) Not disclosing personally identifiable information
from the education records of a student without the prior
written consent of the parent or eligible student, except as
otherwise permitted by §§ 99.31 and 99.37; the policy shall
include, at least:
(i) A statement of whether the educational
agency or institution will disclose personally identifiable
information from the education records of a student under
§ 99.31(a)(1) and, if so, a specification of the criteria for determining which parties are "school officials" and what the
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educational agency or institution considers to be a "legitimate educational interest", and
(ii) a specification of the personally identifiable
information to be designated as directory information
under § 99.21(c):
(4) Maintaining the record of disclosures of personally identifiable information from the education records of
a student required to be maintained by § 99.32, and permitting a parent or an eligible student to inspect that record;i
(5) Providing that a parent of the student or an eligible student with an opportunity to seek the correction of
education records of the student through a request to
amend the records or a hearing under Subpart C, and permitting the parent of the student or an eligible student to
place a statement in the education records of the student as
provided in § 99.21(c);
(b) The policy required to be adopted by paragraph (a) of
this section shall be in writing and copies shall be made available upon request to parents of students and to eligible
students.
§ 99.11 Right to inspect and review education records.
(a) Each educational agency or institution, except as may
be provided by § 99.12, shall permit the parent of a student or
an eligible student who is or has been in attendance at the
agency or institution, to inspect and review the education
records of the student. The agency or institution shall comply
with a request within a reasonable period of time, but in no
case more than 45 days after the request has been made.
§ 99.12 Limitations on right to inspect and review education
records at the postsecondary level.
(b) If the education records of a student contain information on more than one student, the parent of the student or the
eligible student may inspect and review or be informed of only
the specific information which pertains to the student.
§ 99.20 Request to amend education records.
(a) The parent of a student or an eligible student who believes that information contained in the education records of
the student is inaccurate or misleading or violates the privacy
or other rights of the student may request that the educational
agency which maintains the records amend them.
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(c) If the educational agency or institution decides to refuse to amend the education records of the student in accordance with the request it shall so inform the parent of the
student or the eligible student of the refusal, and advise the
parent or the eligible student of the right to a hearing under

§ 99.21.
§ 99.21 Right to hearing.
(a) An educational agency or institution shall, on request,
provide an opportunity for a hearing in order to challenge the
content of a student's education records to insure that information in the education records of the student is not inaccurate,
misleading or otherwise in violation of the privacy or other
rights of the students. The hearing shall be conducted in accordance with § 99.22.
§ 99.22

Conduct of the hearing.

(c) The parent of the student or the eligible student shall
be afforded a full and fair opportunity to present evidence relevant to the issues raised under § 99.21, and may be assisted or
represented by individuals of his or her choice at his or her own
expense, including an attorney ...
§ 99.30 Prior consent for disclosure required.
(a)(1) An educational agency or institution shall obtain
the written consent of the parent or a student or the eligible
student before disclosing personally identifiable information
from the education records of a studenti other than directory IA-7
information, except as provided in § 99.31.
(c) The written consent required by paragraph (a) of this
section must be signed and dated by the parent of the student
or the eligible student giving the consent and shall include:
(1) A specification of the records to be disclosed,
(2) The purpose or puroses of the disclosure, and
(3) The party or class of parties to whom the disclosure may be made.
§ 99.31 Prior consent for disclosure not required.
(a) An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from the education records of a
student without the written consent of the parent of the student or the eligible student if the disclosure is-
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(9) To comply with a judicial order or lawfully issued
subpoena; Provided, that the educational agency or institution makes a reasonable effort to notify the parent or the
student or the eligible student of the order or subpoena in
advance of compliance therewith.
§ 99.32, Record of requests and disclosures required to be
maintained
(a) An educational agency or institution shall for each request for and each disclosure of personally identifiable information from the education records of a student, maintain a
record kept with the education records of the student which
indicates:
(1) The parties who have requested or obtained personally identifiable information from the education
records of the student, and
(2) The legitimate interest these parties had in requesting or obtaining the information.

IA-8

§ 99.37 Conditions for disclosure of directory information.
(a) An educational agency or institution may disclose personally identifiable information from the education records of a
student who is in attendance at the institution or agency if that
information has been designated as directory information (as
defined in § 99.3) under paragraph (c) of this section.
(b) An educational agency or institution may disclose directory information from the education records of an individual
who is no longer in attendance at the agency or institution
without following the procedures under paragraph (c) of this
section.
(c) An educational agency or institution which wishes to
designate directory information shall give public notice of the
following:
(1) The categories of personally identifiable information which the institution has designated as directory
information;
(2) The right of the parent of the student or the eligible student to refuse to permit the designation of any or all
of the categories of personally identifiable information
with respect to that student as directory information; andi
(3) The period of time within which the parent of the
student or the elibible student must inform the agency or
institution in writing that such personally identifiable information is not to be designated as directory information
with respect to that student.
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§ 99.65 Hearing procedures.
(b) Proceduralrules. (1) With respect to hearings involving, in the opinion of the Panel, no dispute as to a material fact
the resolution of which would be materially assisted by oral testimony, the Panel shall take appropriate steps to afford to each
party to the proceeding an opportunity for presenting his case
at the option of the Panel (i) in whole or in part in writing or
(ii) in an informal conference before the Panel which shall afford each party:
(A) Sufficient notice of the issues to be considered (where such notice has not previously been afforded);
and
(B) an opportunity to be represented by counsel.
(2) With respect to hearings involving a dispute
as to a material fact the resolution of which would be materially assisted by oral testimony, the Panel shall afford
each party an opportunity, which shall include, in addition
to provisions required by paragraph (1)(ii) of this paragraph (b), provisions designed to assure to each party the
following:
(i) An opportunity for a record of the
proceedings;
(ii) An opportunity to present witnesses on the
party's behalf; and
(iii)An opportuinity to cross-examine other witnesses either orally or through written interrogatories.
Wash. Super. Ct. C.R. 26(c) provides:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from
whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court in
which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a
deposition, the court in the county where the deposition is to be
taken may make any order which justice requires to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: (1) that
the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on
specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time
or place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of
discovery other than that selected by the party seeking discovery;
(4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the
discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court;
(6) that a deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of
the court: (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be disclosed or be dis-
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closed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simultaneously
file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed enveIA-9 lopes to be opened as directed by the court ...
.1

